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Abstract
The study empirically investigates and shows that on average, the implementation
of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) may contribute in
the fight against global warming. This study finds that on average, a one percent
increase of a percentage point in the bilateral volume of trade as a portion of GDP
between Canada and a typical EU member could help reduce annual per capita
emissions of GHGs in an average CETA member by about .57 percent. The results
also show that the presence of CETA may decrease annual per capita emissions of
GHGs in almost all CETA members. There is no statistically significant evidence
suggesting an increase of GHGs per capita emissions in any CETA member, regard-
less of the model or statistical method employed in the paper. These results stand
because of the combinations of the factor endowment hypothesis (FEH), the pol-
lution haven hypothesis based on population density variations (PHH2), and the
pollution haven hypothesis based on national income differences (PHH1) between
each EU member and Canada.
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1 Introduction
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is a trade deal between the
EU and Canada. The main goal of CETA is to boost trade by reducing tariff rates and
non-tariff trade barriers between the trade partners. CETA consists of 30 chapters, where
chapter 24 entitled “Trade and Environment” contains 16 articles that provide previsions
of the environmental impacts of the trade agreement. The articles also set up goals on pro-
moting the use of environmental friendly technologies and encourage policies that lowers
tariffs and other trade barriers even further for exporting firms (originating from any CETA
member) that use greener technologies. CETA became a reality on September 21, 2017.1
This study empirically evaluates the role of trade openness between the EU and Canada
on air pollution. The empirical models used in this study are based on simple theories of in-
ternational trade and environment. They take advantage of three main arguments related
to trade openness and pollution. In particular, 1) the pollution haven hypothesis based
on national income variations (PHH1), 2) another pollution haven hypothesis based on
national population density differentials (PHH2), and 3) the factor endowment hypothesis
based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory (FEH).2 The combination of the latter three effects
may lead to a race to the bottom (where trade openness weakens environmental policies)
or race to the top argument (where free trade strengthen environmental policies). The
results of this study favor the gains from trade hypothesis implying that the presence of
CETA, may help reduce air pollution for a typical CETA member.
The paper uses a panel dataset of 28 EU members and Canada during the 1990-2016
time period. The empirical analysis in addition to the usual fixed and random effects
with heteroskedastic robust standard errors, it employs fixed effects with robust to cross-
sectional dependence and serial correlation (Driscoll-Kraay) standard errors, respectively.
1During the first year of CETA’s life (September 2017-October 2108), there has been a 7.7%
increase on bilateral trade volume between the EU and Canada relative to the pre-CETA period
(there was a 3.9% increase on Canadian exports into the EU and a 10.8% increase of the EU ex-
ports into Canada). During this year, the total bilateral volume of trade between the trade part-
ners reached $ 155.2 billion Canadian Dollars. For more details and news on topics related
to CETA see its EU official website at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ and its Cana-
dian counterpart at https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/campaign-campagne/ceta-aecg/year_one-
premiere_annee.aspx?lang=eng.
2See Copeland and Taylor (1994), Antweiler et al. (2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2013) for theoretical
explorations over the existence of FEH and PHH1. See also Grossman and Krueger (1993), Antweiler et al.
(2001), Cole and Elliott (2003) and Davis and Caldeira (2010) for empirical evidence consistent to FEH.
See Scott (2005), Levinson and Taylor (2008), Cole and Fredriksson (2009), and López et al. (2013) for
empirical evidence in support of PHH1. In regards to PHH2, Frankel and Rose (2005) was the first study to
investigate the existence of a pollution haven motive based on national population density variations when
evaluating the effects of trade openness on air pollution. However, they find no empirical evidence in support
of PHH2.
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The results yield robust evidence suggesting a negative relationship between trade open-
ness and per capita emissions of GHGs in an average CETA member. They also imply that
the presence of CETA may help reduce per capita emissions of almost all CETA members.
There is no statistically significant evidence that suggests that trade openness between the
EU and Canada would increase per capita emissions of GHGs in any CETA member. All
these results imply that the presence of CETA may indeed help in the fight against a global
externality such as air pollution.3
Theoretically, the presence of CETA may increase per capita emissions of GHGs in low-
income or sparsely populated trade partner due to the possible existence of lax environ-
mental regulations as compared to the rich or densely populated trade partner, respec-
tively. In the sample, there are 17 EU members that are poorer and 11 EU members
that are richer than Canada, but every EU member is very densely populated relative to
Canada. At the same time with PHH1 and PHH2, trade openness between the EU and
Canada, may theoretically also follow FEH. The latter motive originates from the clas-
sical Heckscher-Ohlin theory, where the capital-abundant trade partner has comparative
advantage in the production of capital-intensive goods and the labor-abundant one has
compared advantage in the labor-intensive goods. Plenty of empirical studies find that
capital-intensive goods pollute the environment more than the labor-intensive ones (e.g.,
Jaffe et al. (1995), Antweiler et al. (2001), Cole and Elliott (2003), etc...). Therefore,
according to FEH, trade openness should increase air pollution in capital-abundant trade
partner and reduce it in the labor-abundant one. There are 13 capital-abundant and 15
labor-abundant EU members relative to Canada. Overall, a typical EU member is labor
abundant, poor and densely populated as compared to Canada. Thus, one cannot predict
theoretically the effects of trade openness on pollution following PHH1, PHH2 and FEH.
However, it could be argued that air pollution should increase in capital-abundant but poor
3The study employs a lagged moving average (throughout the whole analysis) when constructing the
income per capita variable, not only to avoid the possible double causality problem between the latter
and the dependent variable, but also to prevent a possible contemporaneous correlation between income
per capita and trade intensity variables. The above results stand despite the use of various robustness
checks. It also uses the third lag of the moving average of income per capita, land per capita, and capital to
labor ratio, respectively. Moreover, it performs two independent instrumental variable approaches in order
to avoid any dual causality issues between the main variable of interest (the ratio between the bilateral
volume of trade over GDP) and per capita emissions of GHGs. In the first one, it employs the Arrelano-
Bond one step difference GMM estimation method. In the second one, it follows Frankel and Rose (2005),
and it employs a two stage least squared econometric approach, where trade is instrumented with a set of
exogenous variables. The regressions are also tested in a subset of CETA members where the Ex-Communist
EU members, or the rich EU members, are evaluated separately when trading with Canada. They are also
tested in various subset of years in the sample subject to the years various members became part of the EU,
or excluding the UK from the sample due to the possible implementation of BREXIT. Furthermore, it also
treats the EU as a single country when constructing the relative values (such the relative income, relative
capital to labor ratio, or relative land per capita) as compared to Canada.
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EU members, but should decrease in labor-abundant but rich EU members.
The empirical results of the study generally yield statistically significant evidence that
proves the existence of FEH and PHH2, respectively. The latter means that the presence
of CETA may force Canada to act as pollution haven. There is robust and statistically sig-
nificant evidence in support of FEH implying that higher trade intensity may push labor-
abundant EU members to pollute the environment less than Canada. However, there is no
evidence that capital-abundant EU members pollute the environment more than Canada.
There is no statistically significance evidence consistent with PHH1 in a typical CETA mem-
ber. On the other hand, there is strong statistically significant evidence in support of PHH1
for a subset of CETA members. In particular, there is robust evidence consistent with PHH1
that suggests that in the presence of CETA, per capita emissions of GHGs tend to fall more
in the rich EU members.
In addition, as theoretically expected, per capita emissions of GHGs fall in labor-abundant
but rich EU members. However, there is no evidence that supports the theory that more
trade between Canada and capital-abundant but poor EU members should increase per
capita emissions of GHGs in the latter EU members. The study reports statistically signifi-
cant evidence implying that higher trade intensity between Canada and the EU members
that are capital-abundant and rich reduces per capita emissions of GHGs in each of the
latter EU members because PHH1 and PHH2 dominate FEH. Furthermore, more trade be-
tween each of the labor-abundant but poor EU members and Canada would also reduce
per capita emissions of GHGs in the majority of the latter EU members. This suggests that
in labor-abundant and poor EU members, FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1. In regards to
Canada that is capital abundant, richer, and extremely sparsely populated than a typical
EU member, the study mainly finds a positive relationship between trade openness and air
pollution, but it is not statistically significant under any model or empirical method used
in the paper. Consequently for Canada, the presence of PHH2 and FEH cancel out PHH1.
Overall, holding all other factors constant, the study finds robust and statistically signif-
icant evidence suggesting that on average, an increase of .01 percent of the bilateral trade
(as a share of GDP) between the EU and Canada may help reduce per capita emission of
GHGs by about .57 percent. This result stands because FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1 in
a typical CETA member. It may also stand because it turns out that per capita emissions of
GHGs fall in labor-abundant EU members, even though the majority of them are poor. At
the same time there is no increase of air pollution in Canada, at least in a statistically sig-
nificant way. Thus, even though per capita emissions fall in almost every EU member, there
is no shift of GHGs from the EU to Canada due to the presence of CETA. One can argue that
the latter result is true because most labor-abundant EU members are the Ex-Communist
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countries. The results show that more trade between them and Canada reduces per capita
emissions of GHGs in each of them. This is mainly due to FEH since PHH1 and PHH2
do not appear to be statistically significant. Therefore, trade openness may force these
EU members to produce more labor-abundant (clean-intensive) goods and simultaneously
force Canada to produce more capital-abundant (pollution-intensive) goods. In this way,
per capita emissions of GHGs originating from capital-intensive goods are shipped from the
labor-abundant members of EU into Canada. However, Canada uses more environmental
friendly technologies in the production of the capital-intensive goods as compared to the
latter EU members (maybe because it is much richer and at a further stage of economic
development as compared to the Ex-Communist members). In this sense, per capita emis-
sions of GHGs go down in a typical labor-abundant EU member and at the same time do
not increase significantly in Canada.
The key result of the study may also rely on the finding that air pollution appears
to fall in rich EU members despite the fact that the majority of them are also capital-
abundant. It appears that in rich and capital-abundant EU members, there is no evidence
of the presence of FEH, but there is evidence consistent with PHH2 and PHH1. The latter
suggests that trade openness between Canada and capital-abundant and rich EU members
may force Canada to act as pollution haven. Consequently, the presence of CETA may
end up pushing Canada to increase air pollution, and simultaneously force the rich EU
members to possibly adopt stringent environmental policies, and therefore, produce less
pollution-intensive goods. Following this argument, the presence of CETA may shift per
capita emissions of GHGs from an average rich EU member to Canada. However, the results
imply that trade openness between Canada and rich EU members reduce air pollution in
a typical rich EU member, but it does not increase it in a statistically significant way in
Canada. This could be related to the fact that the rich EU members may adopt stringent
environmental regulations and in the meantime Canada does not drop its environmental
standards.
Consequently, being a poor EU member does not weaken air pollution policy there
due to trading more with Canada. It could be because poor EU members are also labor-
abundant and densely populated countries. At the same time, for rich and densely popu-
lated EU members, trade openness with Canada may strengthen the air pollution policies
in the latter EU members despite the fact that they are mainly capital-abundant countries.
This does not mean that air pollution shifts from the EU into Canada. Thus, trade open-
ness between the latter and the former trade partner may neither strengthen nor weaken
Canada’s air pollution policies despite the fact that Canada is extremely sparsely populated
compared to any EU member. However, it does strengthen the environmental policies in
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rich EU members and this is probably why the overall air pollution may go down in the
presence of CETA.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the opening up of China in the world markets, and
the creation and extensions of regional political, or/and free trade regional unions, has
generated a lot of debates on the benefits and costs of trade on growth, productivity, in-
novation, etc... Along these lines, from the 90s and on, there has been a theoretical and
empirical burgeoning literature on the interaction between trade and environmental policy,
especially on issues related to trade and air pollution.4 There is a large empirical litera-
ture that highlights the positive impacts of trade on reducing air pollution (e.g., Antweiler
et al. (2001), Cole and Elliott (2003), Frankel and Rose (2005), Levinson (2009), Martin
(2012), McAusland and Millimet (2013), Levinson (2015), Cui et al. (2016), Holladay
(2016), Cherniwchan (2017), Forslid et al. (2018), and Qirjo and Pascalau (2019)). How-
ever, there is also empirical evidence suggesting that trade may help increase air pollution
(e.g., Cristea et al. (2013), Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), and Shapiro (2016))
This study adds in the empirical literature that suggest that trade agreements could
help in the fight against global warming. It is the first empirical study, to the best of our
knowledge, which analyzes the impacts of trade openness between Canada and the EU on
air pollution by using the channels of PHH1, PHH2, and FEH. In this context, the paper
follows the work of Antweiler et al. (2001). However, as in Frankel and Rose (2005), it
applies a relative measurement of land per capita in order to capture PHH2. This hypoth-
esis is absent in the former study. Moreover, it is different from Frankel and Rose (2005)
because they use a cross-sectional dataset and find no evidence of the presence of PHH2,
while this paper employs a panel dataset and finds some evidence consistent with PHH2.
However, the latter motive is not as strong as to force Canada to act as pollution haven
due to the presence of CETA. The study also add in the empirical literature that implies
that are no losers, but only winners in reducing air pollution among members of regional
trade agreements (e.g. Grossman and Krueger (1993) and Gamper-Rabindran (2006) in
the case of NAFTA).
This study is closely related to Qirjo and Pascalau (2019) that uses a panel dataset
including the EU members and the U.S. during 1989-2013 time period. They show that
the possible implementation of the Transatlantic Trade Investment and Partnership (TTIP)
4For theoretical models on trade and environment see Markusen et al. (1993), Copeland (1994),Copeland
and Taylor (1995), Antweiler et al. (2001), Copeland and Taylor (2005), Benarroch and Weder (2006),
and Shapiro and Walker (2018) among others. See also Copeland and Taylor (2004), Copeland (2011),
and Cherniwchan et al. (2017) for a comprehensive review of theory and evidence of the role of trade
on pollution. See also Copeland and Taylor (2017) for a review of trade and environment literature in a
Canadian retrospective.
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may on average help reduce per capita emissions of GHGs. However, this is not the case
for all TTIP members due to the combinations of PHH1, PHH2, and FEH. They find that
trade openness between the EU and the U.S. may help shift air pollution from the former
to the latter trade partner.5 The current study, performing an analogous analysis, finds
that the presence of CETA may help on average, reduce per capita emissions of GHGs.
However, there is no shift of air pollution from one trade partner to the next (at least in
a statistically significant way). Note that both Canada and the U.S. are capital-abundant,
rich and sparsely populates as compared to a typical EU member, respectively. However,
the U.S. is more capital abundant, richer and less sparsely populated than Canada is, as
compared to a typical EU member. Consequently, the results of Qirjo and Pascalau (2019)
and the current study, may suggest that TTIP and CETA could be allies on combating
global warming. However, in the case of TTIP, this is done in the expense of more air
pollution in the U.S. In the case of CETA, there are no losers, in terms of higher air pollution
due its presence. Further, it appears that being extremely sparsely populated does not
necessarily weakens national environmental policy in the trade partner when trading more
with the EU. However, being more capital-abundant may weaken environmental policies
related to air pollution in the trade partner when opening up trade policies with the EU.
Moreover, being richer may not strengthen environmental policies in the trade partner
when increasing trade with the EU.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the dataset and
its sources. Section 3 constructs three main regressions. Section 4 describes the empirical
methodology. Section 5 analyzes the empirical results. Section 6 reports several robustness
checks. Section 7 discusses possible policy implications of the results. Section 8 highlights
the main conclusions of the study.
2 Data Description and their Sources
This study uses a panel dataset that includes 29 countries (28 EU members and Canada)
over 27 years (1990 - 2016). The data for emissions per capita of GHGs are taken from
UNFCCC (2019). Their unit of measurement is in Tg in CO2 equivalent per capita emissions
(note that GHGs data are without the LULUCF). GHGs consists of four main air pollutants
such as 1) Carbon Dioxide (CO2), 2) methane (CH4), 3) nitrous oxide (N2O), and 4)
5This is an interesting result because it contradicts other recent empirical findings that suggest that trade
openness has led to lower air pollution in the U.S. See for example Cherniwchan (2017) that provide empir-
ical evidence of this argument in the case of NAFTA. Levinson (2009) and Levinson (2015) also empirically
validate the latter claim but for trade intensity between the U.S. and the rest of the world.
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Fluorinated gases (F-gases) that include mainly the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the hydro-
fluorocarbons (HFCs), the per-fluorocarbons (PFCs) and the sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).6
The key variable of interest is the trade intensity or simply the trade variable, denoted
with T and it is calculated as the ratio of the sum of bilateral volume of trade (exports and
imports between Canada and each EU member) to GDP. For Canada, when constructing
T, the numerator is the sum of all EU members’ exports to Canada (these are essentially
the imports of Canada from all EU members) and all EU members’ imports from Canada
(these are essentially the exports of Canada from all EU members).7 The data of the
bilateral volume of trade and national real GDP measured in 2011 U.S. Dollars are taken
from IMF (2019). The measurement unit of T is as a percentage of GDP.8
Real GDP per capita is calculated by dividing a country’s real GDP to its population.
Following the literature on trade and pollution, this study employs the three-year moving
average of lagged real GDP per capita instead of a contemporaneous measure to avoid
the possible dual causality problem between pollution and income, Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−1 + 0.3 ∗
Iit−2 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−3. This measure, simply is labeled as income per capita and it is denoted
with I. The data for I, again are taken from IMF (2019) and bilateral nominal exchange
rates are used to measure GDP in real 2011 U.S. Dollars. I is used to build the Relative
real GDP per capita, denoted as RI. This variable is constructed by dividing each country’s
real GDP per capita to the corresponding Canada’s real GDP per capita. Table 2 provides
more detailed information about this measure, while the trade elasticity graphs (located at
the end of the paper) provide a visual description. Table 2 and the trade elasticity graphs
show that there are 11 EU members richer and 17 EU members poorer than Canada. In
6We analyze the impacts of CETA in each of the above main four groups of GHGs, respectively, in a follow-
up project. We find that the implementation of CETA may help reduce per capita emissions of CO2, CH4,
N2O, and F-gases, respectively. For more details see, Qirjo et al. (2019).
7Hence, in each EU member i, Ti =
(
Xi+Mi
GDPi
)
, where Xi and Mi denote each EU member’s exports and
imports with Canada, respectively. For Canada, XCanada. = ∑i Mi and MCanada. = ∑i Xi, respectively.
8In the dataset, most of the volume of trade data are complete. However, there are missing observations
for some of the Ex-Communist EU members in the early 90s (1990-1993) because these countries gained
their independence during these years. For example, Croatia and Slovenia gained their independence from
Yugoslavia in early 90, but we have complete data for these two countries from 1994-2016. Analogously,
there are missing observations from 1990-1992 for the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), but
we have complete data for these Baltic EU members from 1993-2016. The latter countries were part of the
Soviet Union and gained their Independence in early 90s. However, since the missing data are in the very
beginning of the sample and the series exhibits a clear monotonic trend, we use a simple trend regression
to fill in the missing observations. Furthermore, for the countries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia
that did not become independent until 1993, we impute the data (1990-1993) by using the information for
Czechoslovakia and using a “proportional” approach based on a counterfactual analysis. The same strategy is
used for Luxembourg during 1990-1996 time period, using the available data for Luxembourg and Belgium
(reported as one country in this time period) and Belgium (that has also complete observations as a single
country during this time period).
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the paper, the former are referred as rich EU members, while the latter are referred as poor
EU members. The product of T and RI is used to measure PHH1.9 The measurement unit
of T(RI) is in percentage.
The capital to labor ratio data are taken from PWT (2019). It is denoted by KL and
it is in current PPPs 2011 billion U.S. Dollars. The KL variable is built by dividing the
physical capital stock to the labor force, where the latter is measured in thousands. KL
is employed to construct the relative capital to labor ratio, denoted by RKL. This variable
is created by dividing each country’s capital to labor ratio to Canada’s capital-labor ratio.
Table 2 and the trade elasticity graphs confirm that there are 15 EU members that have a
KL ratio lower than Canada’s KL ratio. In the study, the latter EU members are referred as
labor-abundant EU members. There are 13 EU members that have a KL ratio higher than
Canada’s KL ratio. The latter EU members are referred as capital-abundant EU members
or simply capital-abundant countries. The product of T and RKL is used to capture FEH.
The measurement unit of T(RKL) is in percentage.
The annual ratio of the stock of inward Foreign Direct Investment to GDP in each
country provides the FDI measure. IMF (2019) again supplies the data for national GDP,
measured in real 2011 U.S. Dollars and PWT (2019) supplies the data for the physical
stock of capital, also based in 2011 U.S. Dollars.10 The measurement unit of FDI is as a
percentage of GDP.
Land per capita is denoted by LPC. The land data measured in square kilometers are
taken from CIA (2019). Population data measured in millions are taken from IMF (2019).
LPC is measured as the annual log-ratio of the land area of each country to its popula-
tion. LPC is used to build the relative land per capita variable, denoted by RLPC. This
is calculated as the ratio of each EU member’s land per capita to Canada’s LPC. Table 2
and the trade elasticity graphs show that Canada is the most sparsely populated country
as compared to each EU member (i.e. each EU members has a RLPC <1). Thus, in the
paper Canada is referred as sparsely populated CETA member, while each EU member is
referred as densely populated country. The product of T and RLPC is employed to account
for PHH2. The measurement unit of T(RLPC) is in percentage.
9For the GDP variable, there are also some missing observations for the same years and countries as those
of the volume of trade. In the case of Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Luxembourg we employ the same
strategy as in the volume of trade. For the other countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania)
we use a square polynomial trend (since GDP follows an exponential trend) in order to fill in the missing
observations for 1990-1993 time period.
10There are also some missing observations for the FDI variable. Here, we employ a simple trend or square
polynomial trend regression to fill in the missing observations. In particular, we fill out the data for Belgium
and Luxembourg during 1990-2000, Croatia during 1990-1993, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during
1990-1992 time periods.
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Sea dummy denotes a dummy variable that is 0 for landlocked countries and 1 for CETA
members that have access to the sea or the ocean. T(Sea Dummy) interacts Trade with this
dummy variable. The sample in the study includes only five countries that are landlocked
(i.e., Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Slovakia, respectively). English-
French refers to a dummy variable that is 1 for the countries that use English or/and French
as their official languages. Only seven countries in the dataset score a 1 for this variable
(i.e., Canada, the UK, Ireland, Malta France, Belgium, and Luxembourg). The information
to construct the latter two dummy variables is taken from CIA (2019). Euro denotes a
dummy variable that switches to 1 beginning with the year in which a country has offi-
cially adopted the Euro.11 T(Euro) refers to the interaction between Trade and this dummy
variable. The information to build the Euro dummy variable is taken from Eurostat (2019).
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1 and shows a low degree of skewness for
all variables since the means are relatively close to their median.
3 Three Estimating Equations
This section presents the theoretical intuition of the three econometric models (M1, M2,
and M3) employed in this study. In all models, θi denotes the country-specific constant
term, ξt denotes the time-specific constant term, and eit denotes an idiosyncratic measure-
ment error term, where subscripts t and i indicate the year (1990 to 2016) and country,
respectively. GHGsit denotes per capita emissions of GHGs.
The construction of the econometric model 1 (M1) is based on the work of Antweiler
et al. (2001). M1 investigates the relationship between per capita emissions of GHGs and
the trade effect, which is separated into FEH and PHH1. The main variable of interest is
the trade intensity variable denoted by Tit (bilateral volume of trade/GDP between each
EU member and Canada). There are also various control variables such as: 1) the levels
and 2) the squares of income per capita, 3) the direct composition effect of growth, and
4) the composition effect of growth.
GHGsit = θi + ξt + α1Tit + α2T (RKL)it + α3T (RKL)
2
it + α4T (RI)it + α5T (RI)
2
it
+β1 Iit + β2 I2it + β3KLit + β4KL
2
it + β5 I (KL)it + eit (1)
11Note that Euro came to life as a common currency in 1999 and it was an official currency only for
11 EU members (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain). Greece joined in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009,
Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014, Lithuania in 2015. In 2016, there were 19 EU members that have adopted
Euro as their official currency.
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The latter equation (1) is denoted by M1. It employs a set of four trade-based interactions
explanatory variables in order to capture FEH and PHH1. In particular, M1 uses 1) the
interaction of trade intensity with the relative capital to labor ratio, denoted by T(RKL),
in order to detect FEH, and 2) the interaction of trade intensity with relative per capita
income, denoted by T(RI), in order to investigate PHH1. In addition, the interaction of
trade intensity with the squared relative capital to labor ratio denoted by T(RKL)2 and the
interaction of trade intensity with squared relative per capita income, denoted by T(RI)2
are included in order to account for the diminishing returns of each variable, respectively.
The coefficients α2 and α3 capture FEH and the coefficients α4 and α5 measure PHH1.
Note that, on average, Canada acts as a capital-abundant country since a typical EU coun-
try is labor-abundant. However, not all EU countries are labor abundant. There are 13
capital abundant and 15 labor abundant EU members. Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium are
the most capital-abundant countries. Thus, following FEH, Canada should import capital-
intensive goods from these three EU countries implying that CETA should reduce per capita
emissions of GHGs in Canada while increase them in Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium.
At the same time, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland are the most relatively-labor-abundant
countries. Hence, Canada should export capital-intensive goods into these three EU mem-
bers. Consequently, per capita emissions of GHGs should decrease in Bulgaria, Romania,
and Poland, but increase in Canada. Note that these theoretical results are based on the
large empirical literature that suggests that capital-intensive goods pollute the environ-
ment significantly more than the labor-intensive goods.
Simultaneous with FEH, there is PHH1. On average, the empirical validity of PHH1 is
tested by the statistically significance of the slopes α4 and α5. In the dataset, Bulgaria, Ro-
mania, and Latvia are the poorest countries, and therefore, according to PHH1, they should
act as pollution havens because relatively poorer countries design and implement lax en-
vironmental regulations as compared to their trading partner, Canada. Thus, along the
lines of PHH1, per capita emissions of GHGs should increase in these three EU members,
but they should decrease in Canada. Analogously, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Sweden
are the three richest countries in the dataset. Thus, according to PHH1, further trade be-
tween Canada and each of these three EU members may force Canada to act as pollution
haven because relatively richer countries design and implement stringent environmental
regulations as compared to their trading partners. Hence, per capita emissions of GHGs
should decrease in these EU members, but should increase in Canada. In the sample, most
EU members are poorer than Canada, and therefore, potential pollution havens as com-
pared to Canada. Table 2 reports that there are 17 EU members that are poorer and 11 EU
members that are richer than Canada.
11
The trade variable Tit along with its interactions with the other variables in M1 (i.e., the
slopes of α1 to α5) measures the overall impact of trade on pollution. Theoretically, accord-
ing to Antweiler et al. (2001), one could expect that the implementation of CETA via the
combination of both FEH and PHH1 would unambiguously increase per capita emissions
of GHGs in a capital-abundant and poor country (such as Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece,
Italy, or Spain). Analogously, along the lines of PHH1 and FEH, CETA should unambigu-
ously decrease per capita emissions of GHGs in a relatively labor-abundant and rich country
(such as Ireland, the Netherlands, or the UK). However, for the rest of the countries, that
are either labor-abundant and poor, or capital abundant and rich, the implementation of
CETA should theoretically lead to an ambiguous effect of trade on per capita emissions of
GHGs. Put it differently, the implementation of CETA should reduce (increase) per capita
emissions of GHGs in labor-abundant (capital-abundant) countries following FEH, and si-
multaneously increase (decrease) pollution in poor countries because of PHH1. Whether
FEH dominates or is dominated by PHH1 or these two hypothesis cancel each other out, re-
mains an empirical question. See Qirjo and Christopherson (2016), or Pascalau and Qirjo
(2017a) for a similar reasoning in the possible implementation of TTIP.
In regards to the control variables, the national income per capita I captures the effect
of economic growth on the environment.12 The squared per capita income denoted by
I2 allows for the investigation of the existence of the EKC. The importance of national
capital-abundance is measured by the level and the square of the capital to labor ratio
(i.e., KL and (KL)2), where the square accounts for its diminishing returns. The cross-
product of income per capita and capital to labor ratio (i.e., I(KL)) captures the general
composition of growth.
Model 2 (M2) incorporates the works of Antweiler et al. (2001) and Frankel and Rose
(2005). In particular, M2 adds levels and squares of an inverse measure of national pop-
ulation density such as the land per capita (i.e., total square kilometers per number of
inhabitants). Analogously to the argument used for richer countries under PHH1, densely
populated countries may design stringent environmental regulations as compared to the
sparsely populated ones. M2 uses the coefficients associated with these terms (α6 and α7)
to empirically test the validity of PHH2. In addition to these two variables, M2 adds the
inward stock of FDI as a percentage of GDP. An increase in FDI/GDP may increase per
capita emissions of GHGs if multinational corporations choose to move their production in
a country with relatively lax environmental standards due to PHH1 or/and PHH2. This is
12Since our data of the GHGs are in per capita emission levels, we cannot separate the scale from the
technique effects of growth. Therefore, the income per capita variable measures both the scale and technique
effects. In the specialized literature, this is known as the scale-technique effect.
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consistent with the classical pollution haven hypothesis (PHH). It argues that some of the
firms in richer (more densely populated) countries choose to move up entire plants (or just
the dirtiest ones) to the relatively poor (sparsely populated) countries to take advantage
of their relatively lax environmental standards. At the same time, an increase in FDI could
lead to lower per capita emissions of GHGs because multinational cooperation may bring
cleaner technologies that may spillover to the domestic firms. Thus, the impact of FDI/GDP
on pollution is theoretically ambiguous. M2 then writes in the following way
GHGsit = θi + ξt + α1Tit + α2T (RKL)it + α3T (RKL)
2
it + α4T (RI)it + α5T (RI)
2
it
+α6T (RLPC)it + α7T (RLPC)
2
it + β1 Iit + β2 I
2
it + β3KLit + β4KL
2
it
+β5 I (KL)it + β6FDIit + β7LPCit + β8(LPC)
2
it + eit (2)
Table 2 underlines that all countries in the dataset are more densely populated than
Canada. Thus, PPH2 implies that Canada can adopt lax environmental standards, and
therefore, more trade between the EU and Canada may force Canada to act as pollution
haven. Hence, holding everything else constant, further trade due to the implementation
of CETA should increase per capita emissions of GHGs in Canada and decrease them in any
other country in the dataset. Comparing M1 to M2, the inclusion of PHH2 in M2 changes
the unambiguity of the rise of emissions per capita of GHGs in capital-abundant and poor
countries as described in M1. The intuition here is that per capita emissions of GHGs in
capital-abundant and poor countries should theoretically go down if PHH2 dominates FEH
and PHH1. Thus, the inclusion of PHH2 in M2, in theory, produces an ambiguous effect of
trade on per capita emissions of GHGs in capital-abundant but poor EU members.
Moreover, CETA may affect per capita emissions of GHGs more in certain treaty mem-
bers that could be more involved in bilateral trading with Canada due to their geographical
location, culture/language/network differences, or the usage of the same currency. These
effects are included in model 3 (M3) as follows
GHGsit = θi + ξt + α1Tit + α2T (RKL)it + α3T (RKL)
2
it + α4T (RI)it + α5T (RI)
2
it
+α6T (RLPC)it + α7T (RLPC)
2
it + α8T(Sea dummy)it + α9T(Euro dummy)it
+α10T(EnglishFrench dummy)it + β1 Iit + β2 I2it + β3KLit + β4KL
2
it
+β5 I (KL)it + β6FDIit + β7LPCit + β8(LPC)
2
it + eit (3)
In particular, the international trade literature argues that a free trade agreement, such
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as CETA, will intensify the bilateral trade relatively more for the EU members that use En-
glish or/and French as their official languages, since Canada uses English and French as its
official languages. The reasoning here is that trading partners that share the same official
languages tend to have stronger network effects, similar cultural values, similar quality
of institutions (especially in regards to contract design, property rights and enforcement
mechanisms in the rule of law sector), and also relatively low advertisement and labeling
costs for their exports. Thus, M3 proposes an English/French dummy denoted by English-
French dummy and interacts it with T. Theoretically, holding everything else constant, one
would expect more trade between Canada and each of the six EU countries where English
or French is an official language (these countries are the UK, Ireland, and Malta that use
English, at least as one of their official languages, and France, Belgium and Luxembourg
that use French, at least as one of their official languages). Furthermore, M3 also includes
a dummy for sea access denoted Sea dummy and interacts it with T. Since a lot of trade
between Canada and the EU is still done by ships, one would expect, as suggested by the
international trade literature of the gravity models, more trade between Canada and the
EU members that have sea access. However, according to the burgeoning literature in
transportation economics, since the transportation costs among EU members have gone
down significantly in the last two decades mainly due to improvements in infrastructure,
one may suggest that, Ceteris Paribus, there shouldn’t be any significance differences in
trade costs between Canada and Sea Access EU Members as compared to Canada and
Landlocked EU members. However, more trade between Canada and Austria could help
reduce per capita emissions in Austria (a landlocked country) because in the latter country
PHH1 and PHH2 could dominate FEH. If Austria uses Germany ports to ship (pick) most of
its goods into (arriving from) Canada, one can expect an increase in per capita emissions
of GHGs in Germany due to transportation from ships when theoretically eliminating all
trade between Canada and Germany. However, In addition, in M3, whether some countries
adhere to a currency union such as the euro may matter. Theoretically, holding everything
else constant, one would expect more trade between Canada and EU members that are
also part of the Eurozone due to lower trading costs associate with currency exchange
costs. Therefore, in order to capture the Euro effect, M3 adds the euro dummy, simply
denoted with Euro dummy and interacts it with T.
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4 Empirical Methodology
The results of this study are accomplished by using the usual random and fixed effects ap-
proaches that employ heteroskedastic robust standard errors. Furthermore, the paper em-
ploys other specifications that are robust to contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence
and serial correlation effects, respectively. In particular, the study uses a fixed effects re-
gression with Driscoll-Kraay serial correlation robust standard errors that employ a MA(2)
component. Following the environmental literature, the serial correlation effects should
be considered because the pollution and macroeconomic variables usually display mono-
tonic trends. Further, the study corrects for the possibility of cross-sectional dependence
by using such robust standard errors in a standard fixed effects framework. The paper
also employs the simple pooled OLS approach, but the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier
(BP/LM) test rejects it. Therefore, it is not shown for space purposes.
As tables of the next sections report, the evidence suggests that in general, the esti-
mators across the random and fixed effects specifications, respectively are very similar,
especially in terms of sign, significance.
Moreover, the study investigates the existence of unit roots. Table 1 reports the results
from applying the Im-Pesharan-Shin panel unit root test for all series after controlling for
a deterministic time trend only, tend and its squared trend term, and trend and its squared
and cubic trend terms, respectively. All variables are stationary after controlling for the
deterministic time trends, with the exception of relative land per capita that is stationary
around a constant. For the latter, the Harris-Tzavalis unit root test is performed, where
relative land per capital is also found to be stationary around a deterministic time trend.
The latter result is not shown in Table 1, but it is available upon request to the authors.
5 Empirical Results
Tables 3 and 4 report the main results of the study. In particular, Table 3 reports the
“base” results for GHGs emissions per capita. The results using fixed effects for M1, M2
and M3 are shown in the first, second and third columns, respectively. The results of the
same models, using random effects are presented in the fourth, fifth, and sixth columns,
respectively. The seventh, eighth and ninth columns report the results of M1, M2 and M3
using cross-sectional fixed effects. The tenth, eleventh and twelfth columns, respectively,
show the results using serial correlation fixed effects (i.e., with Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors) for the same models.
The key variable of interest is the trade intensity T (the bilateral volume of trade over
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GDP) that along with all of its interactions with the other variables captures the overall
effects of further trade between each EU member and Canada on per capita emissions of
GHGs. Table 3 reports a negative coefficient of trade irrespective of the model and the sta-
tistical specifications used in the study (except under M3 when employing the fixed effects
with cross-sectional dependent robust standard errors, where it is still negative, but not
statistically significant). This evidence suggests that a higher trade intensity between each
EU member and Canada may help reduce per capita emissions of GHGs. Consequently, it
highlights another channel of the gains from trade. However, this result doesn’t imply that
per capita emissions of GHGs would be reduced in every single CETA member. It simply
suggests that, on average, per capita emissions of GHGs would fall as a result of trade
openness between each EU member and Canada.
In order to see the impacts of the implementation of CETA in each of its members’
GHGs per capita emissions, Table 4 reports the elasticities of GHGs per capita with respect
to trade (i.e., the percentage response of GHGs per capita emissions due to a .01 percent-
age point increase in Trade). These elasticities are calculated at sample means using the
delta method. Trade elasticity coefficients based on the fixed effects using serial correla-
tion fixed effects (i.e., with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors) are not reported because they
appear to be identical to the ones originating from cross-sectional fixed effects. The first
three columns present the trade elasticity coefficients using M1 under fixed, random, and
cross-sectional random effects, respectively. The three columns in the middle report trade
elasticity slopes that correspond to M2 under each of the three estimation specifications.
The last three columns present trade elasticity coefficients based on M3 under fixed, ran-
dom, and cross-sectional random effects, respectively. The last row of Table 4 shows the
average total trade elasticities of all CETA members. These results imply a robust and
strongly statistically significant evidence suggesting that on average, .01% increase in the
share of trade to GDP reduces per capita emissions of GHGs by about .57% in M1, .42%
in M2, and .63% in M3. This constitutes the most important result of this study, since it
shows that the presence of CETA may indeed contribute in the fight against global warm-
ing. The study uses such a small scale when reporting the results because, in the sample,
the average ratio of the bilateral trade to GDP between a typical EU member and Canada
is .057%.
The effects of CETA on pollution in each of its members depends on a country’s compar-
ative advantage in pollution-intensive versus clean-intensive goods. In the sample, each
EU member is more densely populated than Canada and the majority of EU members are
labor-abundant and poorer than Canada. However, there are some EU members that are
capital-abundant and richer than Canada. Therefore, it is quite possible theoretically to
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find that some countries in the dataset have negative trade elasticities while others have
positive ones. The results reported in Table 4, show that CETA members’ trade elasticity
estimates are negative and statistically significant for most of the countries in the sample.
The rest of the CETA members, which have trade elasticity coefficients that are mainly
positive, are not statistically different from zero. These countries are Canada, Estonia, and
Finland (bur for both latter EU members, under M1, trade elasticities are negative and
statistically significant). There is not a single trade elasticity coefficient regardless of the
model or estimation method used in this study that is positive and statistically significant.
Consequently, this is the most surprising result of the paper since it shows that the presence
of CETA may reduce per capita emissions of GHGs not only on average, but also in almost
any CETA member. For a visual comparison, the trade elasticity graphs (presented in the
last page of the paper) plot the country-specific elasticities from Table 4 as a function of
income relative to Canada (located on the top). Or, with respect to the capital to labor ra-
tios relative to Canada (located in the middle). And finally, as a function of land per capita
relative to Canada (located at the bottom). The trade elasticities graphs that are based on
M1 are presented in the left column, the ones in the middle column originate from M2,
and the ones in the right column are based on M3. All trade elasticity coefficients used
in building these graphs are calculated using the fixed effects. The shape of each graph
remains the same irrespective of the estimation method used. Note that, for completeness,
in each of these graphs, the values of the trade elasticities are used regardless of their sta-
tistical significance. Again, the shape of each graph does not change when only statistically
significant coefficients of trade elasticity are employed.
An interesting case is Canada, which is capital abundant, richer, and extremely sparsely
populated than a typical EU member. Under M1, for any estimation method, the trade
elasticities for Canada are negative implying that at best, PHH1 dominates FEH, or at
least they cancel each other out, since the trade elasticities for Canada are not statistically
significant. However, under M2 and M3 for all estimation approaches, the trade elasticities
for Canada appear to be positive but not statistically significant suggesting that PHH2
along with FEH slightly dominates (or at least cancels out) PHH1. Other interesting cases
are Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg. Each of these EU members is capital abundant,
richer and more densely populated as compared to Canada. The trade elasticities for these
three EU members are negative and statistically significant, regardless of the estimation
specification and model used in the paper, implying that PHH1 along with PHH2 dominate
FEH. In other words, Canada act as pollution haven (because of the existence of possibly
lax government regulation following PHH1 and PHH2) when trading with these three EU
members despite the fact that imports capital-intensive goods from these countries and
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exports labor-intensive goods into these three EU members.
Note that the implementation of CETA could also help to bring down per capita emis-
sions of GHGs in other EU members such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Romania, and the UK, where the trade elas-
ticities are negative under each model and empirical method employed in the study but
they are not always statistically significant. For more details see Table 4. A more care-
ful examination of the effects of a higher trade intensity (between each EU member and
Canada) on per capita emissions of GHGs is performed in the following paragraphs, where
PHH1, FEH, and PHH2 are examined separately.
The cross-product of trade intensity and relative income per capita along with its
squared measurement capture PHH1. The 4th row in Table 3 reports the coefficients of
T(RI), while the 5th row reports the slopes of T (RI)2. PHH1 argues that the implementa-
tion of CETA increases exports of dirty goods from poor countries and increase exports of
clean goods from rich countries. In other words, poor countries act as pollution havens.
Table 3 reports that the slope of T(RI) is not statistically significant under each model
and/or estimation method employed in the paper. This suggests that, on average, there
is no support of PHH1. However, when observing the trade elasticity graphs associated
with relative income that are located at the top of the last page, there is evidence of the
presence of PHH1 only for countries located to the right of Canada on the horizontal axis.
Therefore, on average, per capita emissions of GHGs go down as countries get richer only
for EU members that are richer than Canada.13 This suggests that Canada may act as pollu-
tion haven if there is more trade between rich EU members and Canada. It is worth noting
that in the sample, the volume of trade between rich EU members and Canada consists of
about 82% of the overall volume of trade between EU and Canada.
The cross-product of trade intensity and relative capital to labor ratio along with its
squared value measure FEH. The 2nd row of Table 3 reports the T(RKL) coefficients, while
the 3rd row shows the coefficients of T (RKL)2 to account for the corresponding diminish-
ing returns. The signs of these two coefficients support FEH for GHGs per capita emissions.
However, the slope of T(RKL) is always positive, but it is only statistically significant un-
der M1 for any empirical methods used in the study (with the exception of cross-sectional
dependence fixed effects, but it is also statistically significant under M2 when employing
13Therefore, there is no empirical evidence that suggest that poor EU members act as pollution havens
due to more trade with Canada. Note that all Ex-Communist EU members are poorer than Canada, and
there is no statistically significant evidence that suggest that they act as pollution havens. This could be
an important result since it is contradictory to earlier empirical evidence that suggests that trade openness
between Central and Eastern European countries and the rest of the world may force these countries to act
as pollution havens (e.g., Kheder and Zugravu (2008)).
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the fixed effects with Driscoll-Kraay serial correlation robust standard errors). This sug-
gests that, at least under M1, the implementation of CETA, on average, would increase per
capita emissions of GHGs in capital-abundant EU members, but would decrease them in
labor-abundant EU members. The set of the elasticity graphs, presented in the middle of
the last page, illustrate the validity of FEH. In the vertical axes, there are trade elasticities
of each TTIP member and the horizontal axes, there are the capital to labor ratios relative
to Canada. Regardless of the model used, these elasticity graphs indicate that, on aver-
age, FEH is valid only for the set of countries that are located to the left of Canada. In
other words, the relatively more labor-abundant EU members pollute the air less. Thus,
more trade between labor-abundant EU members and Canada could force the latter coun-
tries to produce more labor-intensive goods (clean goods) and less capital-intensive goods
(dirty goods). On the other hand, the elasticity graphs show no support of FEH for capital-
abundant EU members as compared to Canada (these are the ones located to the right
of Canada). Note that in the sample, about 40% of the overall volume of trade between
Canada and EU comes from the volume of trade between the labor-abundant EU members
and Canada.
Remember that M1 captures only FEH and PHH1 in the absence of PHH2. Thus, in order
to see the interactions of the former two effects for each country, one can focus on the trade
elasticities of M1 reported in Table 4. Consistent with the theory, Table 4 reports empirical
evidence implying that per capita emissions of GHGs fall in labor-abundant and rich EU
members, due to a higher trade intensity with Canada. In particular, irrespective of the
estimation specification used in this study, under M1, trade elasticities are always negative
for Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK (these are the only rich and labor-abundant
countries in the sample, but their overall trade volume with Canada is about 36% of the
total volume of trade between the EU and Canada). However, they’re only statistically
significant for Ireland but not for the UK and the Netherlands. Trade elasticities of Table
4, provide no empirical evidence consistent with the theory that per capita emissions of
GHGs should increase in capital-abundant and poor EU members, as a result of more trade
with Canada. Under M1, in contrast to the theory, trade elasticity of these EU are always
negative (they’re statistically significant for Greece and Italy, but they are not for Cyprus,
Czech Republic, and Spain). Note that in the sample, only about 14% of the overall volume
of trade between Canada and the EU comes from the volume of trade between the capital-
abundant but poor EU members and Canada.
Using M1, for any estimation method used in the paper, trade elasticities are negative
and statistically significant for the majority of labor-abundant and poor EU members (e.g.,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Poland, and Romania). This suggests that in each of these
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EU members, FEH dominates PHH1. In other words, per capita emissions of GHGs in each
of the latter EU members decrease because they export labor-intensive goods into Canada,
despite the fact that they may act as pollution havens because they are poor. For the rest
of labor-abundant and poor EU members, FEH cancels out PHH1 (since trade elasticities
are not statistically significant despite the fact that they are always negative). Note that
in the sample, only about 4% of the overall volume of trade between the EU and Canada
originates from the trade volume of labor-abundant but poor EU members and Canada.
Under M1, regardless of the empirical methodology, trade elasticities are always negative
and statistically significant for each of the 8 capital-abundant and rich EU members (e.g.,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden). This
implies that per capita emissions of GHGs go down in each of the latter EU member since
Canada acts as pollution haven, despite the fact that each of these EU members exports
capital-intensive goods into Canada. Put it differently, in each of the latter EU members,
PHH1 dominates FEH. Note that in the sample, about 46% of the overall volume of trade
between Canada and the EU comes from the volume of trade between the capital-abundant
but rich EU members and Canada.
The cross-product of trade intensity and relative land per capita along with its squared
measurement are used to capture PHH2. In particular, the 11th row of Table 3 reports the
cross-product of trade intensity and relative land per capita, while the 12th row shows the
product of trade and the squared relative land per capita. Under M2, the coefficients of
T(RLPC) and T (RLPC)2 are consistent with PHH2, where the former coefficient is positive
and statistical significant, and the latter is negative and statistically significant. However,
those coefficients are not statistically significant when using the fixed effects specifications
with Driscoll-Kraay serial correlation robust standard errors. Therefore, there is generally
statistically significant empirical evidence suggesting that, on average, the implementation
of CETA may reallocate the production of dirty goods from the densely populated trade
partner (each EU member) towards the sparsely populated one (Canada). However, it is
difficult to visually confirm the existence of PHH2 when using the trade elasticities graphs
located at the bottom of the last page. This could be related to the fact that Canada is
extremely more sparsely populated as compared to a typical EU member and in this sense,
it is an outlier in the sample.
It could be worth investigating the presence of PHH2 also by focusing on the trade
elasticities differences between M1 and M2 reported in Table 4. It turns out that in 6
EU members (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands,
where their overall volume of trade with Canada is about 43% of the total volume of trade
between the EU and Canada), regardless of the estimation method used, trade elasticities
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are still negative and statistically significant, but with higher absolute value when employ-
ing M2 as compared to those of M1. Note that PHH2 is present in M2, but it is absent
in M1. Therefore, Canada may also act as pollution haven when trading with these EU
members due to PHH2.
In addition, Canada’s trade elasticities are negative under M1, but they appear to be
positive under M2 irrespective of the estimation specification employed. Canada is capital-
abundant, richer and very sparsely populated as compared to a typical EU member. Conse-
quently, the alternation of signs of Canada’s trade elasticities when using M2 as compared
to M1 suggests that Canada may act as pollution haven when trading with an average EU
member due to PHH2. However, Canada’s trade elasticities are not statistically significant.
Focusing on M3, one can evaluated the relationship between more trade and per capita
emissions of GHGs in trade partners that use the same languages, or have access to the
sea, or belong to a monetary union, respectively. In particular, the paper employs three
dummies: 1) the product of trade and a language dummy (English and/or French =1)
shown in the 16th row, 2) the product of trade and a Sea dummy (Sea=1) shown in the
17th row, and 3) the product of trade and a Euro dummy (where Euro=1) reported in the
18th row of Table 3.
The results yield statistically significant evidence, implying that on average, the pres-
ence of CETA in countries that use English or (and) French as their official language(s)
may help reduce per capita emissions of GHGs, as compared to countries where English
or French is not an official language. Theoretical literature in international trade suggests
that there is relatively more trade between trade partners that share similar/same lan-
guages and cultural values mainly due to the existence of stronger network effects and
lower advertisement and label costs for exports. Indeed, the dataset employed in this
study validate the latter claim, where in the sample about 47% of the overall volume of
trade between Canada and the EU originates from the volume of trade between Canada
and the six EU members where English or French is an official language (UK with 27%,
France with 11.2%, Belgium with 5.2%, Ireland with 2.6%, Malta with .2%, and Luxem-
bourg with .3%). The negative relationship between per capita emissions of GHGs and
further trade between English/French speaking EU members and Canada could be related
to the existence of similar institutional qualities (such as contract design, property rights
and enforcement mechanisms in the rule of law sector) among these countries. One can
suggest that an increase in trade intensity between these trade partners could have en-
couraged these countries to better ameliorate and coordinate their efforts (especially on
the enforcement mechanism of the rule of law) when dealing with sensitive environmental
issues associated with the increase of their national productions.
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The empirical results of M3, indicate that in CETA members that have sea or ocean
access, the raise of trade between Canada and the EU is associated, on average, with higher
per capita emissions of GHGs, as compared to countries that are landlocked. This result
could support the theory that further trade between Canada and landlocked EU members
could help increase per capita emissions of GHGs in EU members with sea access because
the former EU members use the ports of the latter EU members when trading with Canada.
Therefore, per capita emissions of GHGs in the EU members with sea access could go up
simply because there are more ships coming from and going into Canada from the latter
EU members because of the ongoing trade between Canada and landlocked EU members.
Thus, in addition to FEH, PHH1, and PHH2, there is another channel that trade intensity
may influence per capita emissions of GHGs in a typical CETA member. This channel is
associated with the fact that some EU members have access to the sea and some others are
landlocked. The results reported in Table 3, suggest that CETA members that have access
to the sea or ocean may have higher per capita emissions of GHGs relative to landlocked
EU members due to the presence of CETA. However, one should note that in the sample,
there are only 5 countries that are landlocked and their total volume of trade with Canada
is only about 4% of the total volume of trade between the EU and Canada.
The results of table 3 show statistically significant evidence, implying that the imple-
mentation of CETA in EU members that use Euro as their common currency would increase
per capita emissions of GHGs relative to countries where Euro is not an official currency.
This result could be associated to the fact that GHGs, which are related to energy and
transportation needs, may be facilitated by the use of the same currency.
In a nutshell, the key result of this study implies that the presence of CETA may con-
tribute in the fight against global warming because it may help reduce per capita emissions
of GHGs in a typical CETA member. Moreover, there is no statistically significant evidence
that suggests that the implementation of CETA could increase per capita emissions of GHGs
in any CETA member regardless of the model or empirical methodology employed in this
paper. Furthermore, it provides robust and statistically significant evidence that implies
that the presence of CETA may help reduce per capita emissions in almost every CETA
member. This results stands due to the combinations of FEH, PHH1, and PHH2 between
each EU member and Canada.
Generally, there is statistically significant evidence in support of FEH and PHH2. How-
ever, there is no statistically significance evidence consistent with PHH1 in a typical CETA
member. On the other hand, there is strong statistically significant evidence in support of
PHH1 for a subset of CETA members. In particular, there is robust evidence consistent with
PHH1 that suggests that in the presence of CETA, per capita emissions of GHGs tend to fall
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more in the richest EU members forcing Canada to act as pollution haven when trading
with the rich EU members. There is also robust statistically significant evidence in support
of FEH implying that labor-abundant EU members pollute the environment less if trade
between them and Canada increases due the presence of CETA. In regards to PHH2, one
should remember that each EU member is more densely populated as compared to Canada.
Thus, the latter CETA member should act as pollution haven due to the implementation
of CETA. Trade elasticities of Table 4 for Canada confirm this argument because they alter
signs from negative to positive when employing M2 instead of M1. However, they are
never statistically significant. On the other hand, trade elasticities of 6 EU members re-
main negative and statistically significant but with higher absolute values when using M2
instead of M1. This could validate the presence of PHH2 suggesting that Canada may act
as pollution haven if it trades more with these 6 EU members.
Moreover, a higher trade intensity between Canada and the EU members that are
capital-abundant and rich reduces per capita emissions of GHGs in each of the latter EU
members because PHH1 and PHH2 dominate FEH. In addition, per capita emissions of
GHGs fall in labor-abundant but rich EU members due to further trade with Canada be-
cause in the latter EU members, FEH, PHH1, and PHH2 forces them to produce mainly
the cleaner goods and import the dirtier goods from Canada. Furthermore, a higher trade
intensity between each of the labor-abundant but poor EU members and Canada would
also reduce per capita emissions of GHGs in the majority of the latter EU members. This
suggests that in labor-abundant and poor EU members, FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1.
There is no evidence that confirms the theory that more trade between Canada and capital-
abundant but poor EU members should increase per capita emissions of GHGs in the latter
EU members.
A short summary of the results of the control variables applied in the three models is
presented in the rest of this section. The slopes of income per capita are reported in the
6th row of Table 3, while the 7th row reports its squared value to investigate the existence
of an EKC. Inconsistent with the EKC argument, it appears that there is a positive and
monotonic relationship between per capita income and per capita emissions of GHGs.14
The 8th row of Table 3 reports the direct composition effect of growth captured by
14We investigate further the empirical validity of the EKC in a follow up project, where we control for
various political economy variables such as the GINI coefficient, the rule of law index, institutional quality
measurement, etc... We confirm the results found here in regards to the inconsistency of the EKC even
when we add the cubic per capita income and break down GHGs into 4 main GHGs. For more details, see
Pascalau et al. (2019). See also Pascalau and Qirjo (2017b)for a similar analysis applied in the case of TTIP.
They confirm that empirical validity of the EKC for CO2, CH4, HFC/PFC/SF6, but they find a monotonically
positive relationship between income per capita and GHGs per capita. They claim that the latter result is
associated mainly to the positive relationship between per capita income and N2O per capita.
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the capital-labor ratio, while and 10th row reports its squared value. The 9th row shows
the general composition effect of growth proxied by the product of income per capita and
capital-labor ratio. The results indicate a negative and statistically significant relationship
between either the direct, or the general composition of growth and per capita emissions
of GHGs, respectively.
The 14th row of Table 3 reports the relationship between land per capita and per capita
emissions of GHGs, while the slopes of squared land per capita are shown in the 15throw.
On average, there is no statistically significant evidence confirming a relationship between
the inverse measurement of population density and per capita emissions of GHGs.
The effect of inward FDI (as a share of GDP) on per capita emissions of GHGs is shown
in the 13th row of Table 3, under M2 and M3. The results imply a positive and statisti-
cally significant relationship between inward FDI and per capita emissions of GHGs in a
typical CETA member. This is consistent with the theory that multinational corporations
may have chosen to move the entire production of dirty goods (or the production of their
intermediate dirty goods) in the foreign nations.
6 Robustness Checks
For all tables and trade elasticity graphs of the previews section, to avoid the possible
double causation between per capita emissions of GHGs and income per capita as iden-
tified in the Porter Hypothesis, the study proxies per capita income with its first lag of a
weighted three years moving average (Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−1 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−2 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−3).15 This
measurement performs better in the sample in terms of lower root mean squared forecast
error as compared to an equally weighted scheme. Note that the use of the lagged per
capita income also avoids the possible contemporaneous correlation between income per
capita and trade intensity variables (e.g., Chisik et al. (2016) examine theoretically the
relationship between trade and population aging via the income channel). In this section,
additional robustness checks are performed.
First, the paper employs the third lag of income per capita, capital to labor ratio, and
land per capita (e.g., Iit = 0.6 ∗ Iit−3 + 0.3 ∗ Iit−4 + 0.1 ∗ Iit−5), respectively. This could be a
more cautions way, not only to avoid the possible dual causality between per capita income
and per capita emissions of GHGs, but also to avoid the possible multicollinearity issues
between income per capita, capital to labor ratio, land per capita variables and the trade
intensity variable, respectively. The results are shown in Table 5 and they are similar to
15See Porter (1991) on details on the latter hypothesis. See also Ambec et al. (2013) and Cohen and Tubb
(2018) for recent theoretical and empirical evidence on evaluating the Porter Hypothesis.
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the base results of Table 3. The trade slope is still negative regardless of the model or the
empirical methodology used, however it loses its statistical significance only for M1 and M2
under random, fixed, and serial correlation fixed effects. However, it is always statistically
significant irrespective of the model when using the fixed effects setting with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors.16 The result are also similar to the base results when employing a
second or a forth lag of the weighted three years moving average of the above variables,
respectively.
Second, the study constructs a dummy variable, where 1 is for Ex-Communist EU mem-
bers and 0 for the rest of the EU members. This dummy is multiplied by T, T(RKL), T(RI),
T (RKL)2, T (RI)2, T(RLPC), and T (RLPC)2. In this way, one can isolate the environmen-
tal impacts of trade between Ex-Communist EU members and Canada. Table 6 reports
the results of this approach, where EE stands for the Ex-Communist EU members Dummy.
There is statistically significant evidence suggesting that the presence of CETA reduces per
capita emissions in a typical EU member. However, regardless of the model or empirical
specification used in the paper, there is no statistically significant evidence confirming the
latter result for pollution and trade between Canada and Ex-Communist EU members. The
slopes of T(RKL) when using the EE are mainly negative (but only statistically significant
under M2 when employing the fixed effects allowing for cross sectional dependence of the
standard errors). These negative coefficients are theoretically expected and suggest the
presence of FEH when Canada trades with Ex-Communist EU members. This is related to
the fact that all the latter EU members are labor-abundant countries with the exception
of the Czech Republic. In other words, the presence of CETA may force Ex-Communist
EU members to produce more labor-abundant (cleaner) goods and import more capital-
abundant (dirty) goods from Canada. The results of Table 6 are mainly consistent with
PHH1, but exactly as in the base results, they are not statistically significant. Thus, there
is no statistically significant evidence that implies that each Ex-Communist EU member
would act as pollution haven as a result of CETA. Remember that they are all poor coun-
tries relative to Canada. Therefore, one may suggest that in a typical Ex-Communist EU
member, there is no statistically significant evidence of a relationship between per capita
emissions of GHGs and trade intensity because FEH cancels out PHH1 and PHH2. Note
that the volume of trade between Canada and the Ex-Communist EU members consist of
only about 4% of the total trade volume of Canada and the EU.
Third, the study constructs a dummy variable, where 0 is for the poor EU members and
1 for the rich EU members. This is labeled as Rich which stands for the Rich EU-Members
16The Driscoll-Kraay Fixed Effects approach controls both for cross-section dependence and serial correla-
tion in standard errors up to the second lag.
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dummy. Analogously to the EE, the Rich dummy is interacted with the trade intensity
variable and all trade covariates. Consequently, one can test the environmental impacts of
trade between Rich EU members and Canada. Table 7 reports the results of this approach.
There is statistically significant evidence suggesting that the presence of CETA reduces per
capita emissions in a typical EU member. Moreover, there is also statistically significant ev-
idence confirming the latter result for air pollution and trade between Canada and the rich
EU members. However, it is statistically significant only under M2 when employing fixed
effects with Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors. Note that in this case, the magnitude
of the trade intensity coefficients are much higher for a typical rich EU member relative
to an average EU member. The slopes of T(RKL) are negative and statistically significant
(while the slopes of T(RKL)2 are positive). Note that the majority of Rich EU members are
capital-abundant (only 3 out of 11 are labor-abundant). Also, the latter slopes were ex-
pected to be negative after observing the trade elasticity graphs located in the middle row
of the last page. The results of Table 7 consistently with PHH1, report positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficients of T(RI), and negative and statistically significant coefficients
of T(RI)2. Hence, there is statistically significant evidence that implies that Canada could
act as pollution haven as a result of CETA. The presence of CETA would encourage a typical
Rich EU member to produce cleaner goods due to the existence of stringent environmental
regulations and also import dirtier goods from Canada that theoretically would have lax
environmental regulations. This is because these EU members are richer and more densely
populated than Canada. Note that the volume of trade between Canada and the rich EU
members consist of about 82% of the total trade volume of Canada and the EU. The results
reported in Tables 6 and 7 stand in terms of the sign and statistical significance for the
variables of interest, even when the trade covariates (in addition to the trade and dummy
covariates) are included in the regressions.
Fourth, the study instruments the potential endogeneity between trade and per capita
emissions of GHGs, by using the Arrelano-Bond one step difference GMM estimation method.17
This approach allows for 1 lag of GHGs per capita (the dependent variable) and instru-
ments it with 3 and 4 lags, respectively. The results are statistically significant and negative
for the trade intensity variable.
Fifth, the study follows Frankel and Rose (2005) two stage least squared econometric
technique in order to correct for potential double causality problem between per capita
17We also use the Arrelano-Bond two step difference GMM estimator and a system GMM specification.
When using both instrumental variable approaches, we run into an instrumental proliferation issue, where
we get a perfect Hansen statistics of 1. This is also the case when we instrument both trade and income with
lags using the Arrelano-Bond one step difference GMM estimator. Under all these scenarios, instruments
either fit the endogenous variables or (and) they outnumber the individual countries.
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emissions of GHGs and trade intensity. In particular, it instruments trade with a set of
exogenous variables including exchange rate, capital to labor ratio, price of exports and
imports, land per capita, and four dummies for whether a country has adopted euro, or it is
not landlocked, or uses English or French as its official language, or was part of the first 11
countries that joined the EU, respectively. The instruments are created using the predicted
values and RKL, RI, and RLPC, respectively. The structural equation includes the trade
instrument along with its covariates in addition to all exogenous variables. The results
confirm the negative relationship between per capita emissions of GHGs and the trade
intensity instrumental variable, albeit they are statistically significant only when applying
the fixed effects specification with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.18
Sixth, Table 3 reports a positive and statistically significant slopes of FDI, confirming the
classical PHH. Theoretical literature in trade and environment (e.g. Copeland and Taylor
(2004) ) suggests that horizontal FDI is highly associated with PHH, but this is not the
case for the vertical FDI. This is because rich countries could move their entire production
plants of their dirty goods toward poor countries taking advantage of lax environmental
regulations there. This could be the case here since the presence of CETA decreases tariffs
dramatically and some Canadian firms may choose to relocate their production in the Ex-
Communist EU members. Thus, the study employs a dummy variable with a value of 1
if the country is an Ex-Communist EU member and zero otherwise. The results indicate
no significant evidence of a relationship between inward FDI in a typical Ex-Communist
member (horizontal FDI) and per capita emissions of GHGs. However, there is statistically
significant evidence that suggests one percentage point increase in inward FDI in a typical
Western EU member (vertical FDI) is associated with an increase of per capita emissions
of GHGs of about .03 percentage points, on average.
Seventh, the study employs a subset of the data under different time period in order to
account for the time when each country joined the EU. In this context, the three regressions
are tested on: 1) the 6 original EU countries (of the 1958 agreement) and Canada over
1990-2016; 2) the 9 EU countries (of the 1973 agreement) and Canada during 1990-
2016; 3) the 10 EU countries (of the 1981 agreement) and Canada on 1990-2016; 4)
the 12 EU countries (of the 1986 agreement) and Canada over 1990-2016; 5) the 15 EU
members (of the 1995 agreement) and Canada during 1995-2016; 6) the 25 EU members
(of the 2004 enlargement) and Canada on 2004-2016; 7) the 27 EU members (of the
2007 enlargement) and Canada during 2007-2016; 8) the 28 EU members (of the 2013
enlargement) and Canada on 2016; and finally, 9) the 27 EU members, where the UK
18The Driscoll-Kraay Fixed Effects regression should be theoretically superior to the rest, since it controls
both for cross-section dependence and serial correlation in the standard errors.
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is excluded due to BREXIT. These key result of the paper concerning the trade intensity
variable is still the same in terms of the sign but is it is generally more strongly statistically
significant as compared to the result reported in Table 3.
Eighth, in regards to the capital labor ratio, instead of proxing the labor force by emp
(numbers of persons engaged) as defined in PWT (2019), one can use the product of
emp and average hours of labor, or the product of emp and average hours of labor and
human capital. The results are very similar to all results in the study in terms of sign and
statistically significance.
Ninth, the study also evaluates the relative income, the relative capital to labor ratio,
and the relative land per capita of the overall EU as compared to Canada, respectively.
Under this scenario, the EU is capital-abundant, poor and densely populated as compared
to Canada. All three regressions are tested again using the same 4 empirical specifications.
The key result of the paper still stands and it is statistically significant under any model or
empirical method used in the paper. Note that for realistic reasons, the results highlighted
in the previews section are to be trusted more than the latter result. This is because there
are still trade barriers within EU members (such as different languages, culture, etc...) as
compared to different provinces within Canada (or within the different states of the US).
However, the key result still stands regardless of how one measures the relative variables
of the EU members as compared to Canada.
Finally, the regressions are run using unbalanced panel (without filling the missing
observations in the data as described in the footnotes of section 2). All the results are
extremely similar to all results in the paper. Note that for space purposes, the results of
this section that are not included in the tables of the paper are available upon request from
the authors.
7 Discussion of the Results and Policy Implications
A lot of studies and reports summarized in various climate change conventions (i.e. the
Kyoto Protocol meetings, the Paris Climate Change Agreement, etc...) have concluded that
the fight against global warming requires stringent global regulations in order to achieve
visible goals such as a reduction of global GHGs emissions. These goals are impossible to
be achieved simply by enforcing regulations only at a national level, but they require global
coordination. In this sense, air pollution is considered a pure global externality. Therefore,
an existence of a global organization (similar to WTO) that sets up rules and regulations
and imposes enforcement mechanisms with explicit legal and economic penalties could be
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a necessary tool for fighting this international negative externality. The implementation
and efficiency of this organization requires at least the participation as official members of
most of the world economies.
However, there are no guarantees that policies set by such global organization could
force large developing economies such as China, India, or Russia to adopt similar policies
on GHGs emissions reductions as compared to developed countries. This is because of the
existence of significant differences on standard of living between developed and develop-
ing countries, forcing the latter ones to act as pollution havens. Consequently, a possible
short term solution could be the encouragement of international trade agreements, es-
pecially the ones among developed and developing countries, where environmental stan-
dards are part of trade negotiations. The economic benefits from trading with developed
countries may force the developing countries (that would be potential members of the free
trade area) to adopt similar environmental policies with the former countries. These inter-
national free trade areas may impose carbon tariffs on imported goods from non-member
countries.19 The adoption of a carbon tariff on imported goods could increase the bargain-
ing power of the international free trade areas when dealing with pollution-intensive goods
originating from non-members developing countries. It may also reduce the presence of
pollution havens in non-members developing countries because international corporations
from developed countries may not find it beneficial to relocate their production in these de-
veloping countries to take advantage of their lax regulations. Therefore, it could increase
the efficiency of such policy in global terms. This could be an example of future benefits in
the fight against global warming that the existence of international free trade agreements
could achieve, at least in the short-term. In this light, the presence of an international
trade agreement, such as CETA could be a step in stone in the right direction.
CETA is one of the few ratified regional trade agreement that has included a trade and
pollution chapter in the deal. This is the Chapter 24 of CETA and it includes 16 articles.20
19Copeland (1996) is the first theoretical study to introduce a pollution content tax on imports. Abrego
et al. (2001) derive implications on linking global trade and environmental policy. Carbone et al. (2009) use
a game-theoretical structure to analyze potential benefits of global trade in emissions permits.
20For more details, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/. In ad-
dition to chapter 24 on Trade and Environment, see also chapter 22 entitled “Trade and Sustain-
able Development (TSD)”. Note that the largest international free trade agreement that has included
a chapter of environment and trade in its negotiations is TTIP. For more details on this chapter
see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/august/tradoc_154837.pdf. However, despite the earlier
progress on trade negotiations between the EU and the US, the trade talks have been put into a halt from Au-
gust of 2016. On the other hand, Canada and the EU not only have reached an agreement, but also 98% of it
is ratified by each member and their respective regional governments. On September, 13 2018, EU and Cana-
dian committee members of TSD, have met to discuss progress on the procedure and institutional structures
for the effective implementation of TSD chapters and exchange views on priority areas of trade and environ-
ment. For more details see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157409.pdf.
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One of the main goals is to prevent either trade partner from relaxing their laws in or-
der to boost trade, and therefore, creating possible pollution havens. Another important
goal is in Article 9 and favors the reduction of various non-tariff barriers for environmen-
tally friendly goods. Article 16 discusses the cooperation on environmental issues, where
trade in environmental friendly goods and the adoption and progress of green technol-
ogy is promoted. It encourages changes in environmental laws and regulation of each
member that promote the use of efficient energy in export goods. It promotes the positive
spillover effects of environmental friendly technologies used by trade partners. These are
also important measures that may prevent any future race to the bottom motive and rather
encourage race to the top hypothesis in the presence of CETA.
This paper analyzes the impact of trade between the EU and Canada on per capita
emissions of GHGs during 1990 to 2016 time period. The main finding of the paper is
the existence of a robust and statistically significant evidence of a negative relationship
between trade intensity and per capita emissions of GHGs in a typical CETA member. It
reports robust and statistically significant evidence implying that higher trade intensity
between Canada and the EU is associated with lower per capita emissions of GHGs in
almost all CETA members. There is no statistically significant evidence that trade between
Canada and the EU raises per capita emissions of GHGs in any CETA members.
CETA entered into force provisionally on September, 21, 2017. The study did not
included data for 2017 and 2018 years due to missing observations of the main variables
of interest for the majority of the CETA members. The presence of CETA, on average, is
expected to decrease per capita emissions of GHGs, at least theoretically, even further from
the empirical results of this study, due to the environmentally friendly procedures laid
out in various articles of chapter 24. There is empirical evidence that suggests that trade
agreements with environmental provisions tend to reduce air pollution (e.g., Baghdadi
et al. (2013) in the case of CO2). However, for CETA, this a subject for empirical validation
in future studies that will make use of 2017 and later data.
Despite the empirical evidence implying the positive impacts of free-trade agreements
on reducing air pollution, there is still much public support over the race to the bottom
hypothesis on free trade and pollution. In the case of CETA, not even a single politician
from the EU or Canada has advertised the potential environmental gains from the presence
of CETA. There are plenty of interviews from various politicians from both trade partners
highlighting the benefits of CETA on small, medium and large firms.21
21See for example a short report, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradoc_154775.pdf.
See also various interviews from the EU and Canadian politicians emphasizing the positive economic im-
pacts of CETA in both trade partners. They have summarized the positive effects of CETA on innovation,
productivity, employment, quality of products, etc... There is not even an interview in support on the
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This study suggests that, in a typical CETA member, per capita emissions of GHGs would
be reduced due to the implementation of CETA because of simple economics related to the
volume and patterns of trade between trade partners. In particular, this study provides
evidence implying that an increase on trade intensity between Canada and labor-abundant
members of the EU seems to decrease the production of capital-intensive (dirty) goods and
increase the production of labor-intensive (clean) goods in the latter EU countries. In this
way, per capita emissions of GHGs originating from capital-intensive goods are shipped
from the labor-abundant members of the EU into Canada. However, the latter country uses
more environmental friendly technologies in the production of latter goods as compared
to the latter EU members. In this sense, overall per capita emissions of GHGs go down.
This study reports robust and statistically significant evidence supporting the idea that
rich countries pollute the environment less because they support the design and imple-
mentation of stringent environmental regulation. The paper implies that the latter result
is empirically valid only for rich CETA members. Consequently, an increase in trade inten-
sity between Canada and the rich members of the EU would reduce per capita emissions
of GHGs in the latter countries (e.g., 01% increase in bilateral trade between Canada and
Luxembourg that is the riches EU member, with about twice higher GDP per capita relative
to Canada, could reduce annual per capita emissions of GHGs in Luxembourg by about
3%).
Theoretically Canada may act as pollution haven due to the implementation of CETA
because it is extremely sparsely populated as compared to each EU member. Following
Frankel and Rose (2005), countries that are sparsely populated tend to have lax environ-
mental standards, and therefore, a reduction of tariffs could lead to higher production of
pollution-intensive goods due to lower costs in these countries as compared to densely
populated trade partners. Consequently, the Canadian officials may want to keep an eye
on this type of pollution haven. However, the study does not find a statistically significant
evidence of this argument for Canada. Moreover, the officials of Finland, Sweden, and
Latvia, (the three EU members with the highest land per capita in the EU) may also want
to keep an eye on this phenomenon despite the fact that the paper does not report any
statistical significant evidence consistent with this hypothesis. For more details, compare
the signs, magnitude and statistically significance of trade elasticity coefficients of M1 to
environmental gains of CETA from the economics point of view. For more information, see the official
EU website on the CETA related issues, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_en.htm, or
the official Canadian website on CETA, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/campaign-campagne/ceta-
aecg/index.aspx?lang=eng. There are news on the possible implementation and inclusion of Paris Cli-
mate Change Agreement in CETA, but there are no reports or news in the economics behind the re-
duction of GHGs per capita that the presence of CETA may bring on average. See for example,
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/ceta-taking-action-trade-and-climate_en.
31
those of M2 for Canada and the latter three EU members, respectively.
The paper shows that per capita emissions of GHGs in Canada would increase due to
the presence of CETA. However, this result is never statistically significant regardless of the
empirical specification or model used in the study. Therefore, this study suggest that the
presence of CETA may help reduce per capita emissions in almost all EU member and at
the same time does not increase them (at least in a statistically different way from zero) in
Canada. Consequently, even though per capita emissions fall in almost every EU country,
there is no shipment of GHGs from the EU to Canada or vice versa due to the presence of
CETA.22
It is worth mentioning that all above results are based on the assumption that the trade
intensity variable would increase in the presence of CETA. This is a reasonable assumption
based on the classical trade theory that suggests that trade between trade partners boosts
when tariff rates and other trade barriers are removed or reduced significantly. It turns out
that in the first year of the presence of CETA (September 2017-October 2018), the volume
of trade between the EU and Canada has increased by about 7.7%.23 This is an equivalent
of about .03% increase of the bilateral volume of trade between Canada and the EU as a
share of GDP. In the absence of GHGs per capita emissions data for this time period, one
can use the prediction of this study to evaluate the role of CETA on air pollution. Thus,
.03% increase of the trade intensity variable due to the realistic presence of CETA could be
associated with the reduction of annual per capita emissions of GHGs by about 1.71% in
a typical EU member during the September 2017-October 2018 time period. One can use
the trade elasticity values, reported in Table 4, to predict the changes of per capita GHGs
emissions in each CETA members.
In conclusion, we hope that the results of this study may help raise public awareness
on the positive impact of CETA on air pollution and possible encourage politicians on
both sides of the Atlantic to talk more about the environmental gains of CETA along the
other trade benefits they often advertise in CETA official websites. We also hope that other
22However, CETA environmental previsions along with the empirical results of this study may help increase
air pollution in the world even though the presence of CETA decrease air pollution in its members. This
is known as the carbon leakage phenomenon. Under this scenario, the presence of CETA may force its
members to concentrate production to their core and cleaner products and import pollution-intensive goods
from pollution havens located in the rest of the world. And therefore, the overall air pollution may go up.
i.e., see Bohringer et al. (2016) for theoretical scenarios that study the effect of boarder taxes on carbon
leakage. Or, see Barrows and Ollivier (2014) who show that reduced air pollution from exporters as a result
of lower tariffs is solely associated to their production mix and not to applications of more environmentally
friendly technologies.
23For more information in regards to the increase of the volume of trade between each EU member and
Canada, or and to see the top 5 imports and exports categories for each EU member and Canada under
the September 2017- October 2018 time period, see https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/campaign-
campagne/ceta-aecg/year_one-premiere_annee.aspx?lang=eng
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studies related to the potential impact of CETA on air pollution or/and other environmental
variables will follow the present one, making use of more recent data or break down
pollution data by sector, or analyze firm level data and so on.
8 Conclusion
This study uses a panel dataset of all EU members and Canada over the 1990-2016 time
period. The key results of the paper reports empirical evidence highlighting a negative
relationship between trade intensity and per capita emissions of GHGs in a typical CETA
member. More specifically, it indicates robust and statistically significant evidence suggest-
ing that one percent increase on a percentage point of the bilateral trade, as a share of GDP,
between Canada and an average EU member may help reduce annual per capita emissions
of GHGs by about .57 percent. This results implies that in a typical CETA member, the pres-
ence of CETA (which came to life, in the real world, on September 2018) may indeed be a
realistic example of positive impacts of international trade agreements on air pollution. It
provides robust and statistically significant evidence implying that the implementation of
CETA reduces per capita emissions of GHGs in almost any CETA member regardless of the
model or empirical method employed in the paper. Furthermore, there is no statistically
significant evidence that suggest a positive relationship between trade intensity and per
capita emissions of GHGs in any CETA member.
The above result holds due to the combinations of FEH, PHH1 and PHH2 between
trade partners. The study yields robust and statistically significant evidence consistent
with PHH1, only for rich CETA members as compared to Canada. PHH1 claims a negative
relationship between GHGs per capita and income per capita, due to possible existence of
lax environmental regulations in poorer countries. In this light, Canada may act as pollu-
tion haven when trading with rich EU members. The results also highlight robust evidence
consistent with FEH only for labor-abundant EU members. FEH claims that air pollution is
reduced (increased) in labor-abundant (capital-abundant) countries. Following this argu-
ment, FEH is empirically validated when Canada trades with labor-abundant EU members,
but it disappears when Canada trades with capital-abundant EU members. Canada is very
sparsely populated as compared to any EU member. Following this fact means that Canada
could act as pollution haven, at least theoretically, according to PHH2 as a result of the
presence of CETA. The study finds empirical evidence that supports the latter argument for
Canada, but they are not statistically significant under any empirical specification used in
the paper (e.g. see Table 4 and compare the trade elasticities for Canada between M1 and
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M2).
An average EU member is labor-abundant, poor and densely populated as compared
to Canada. Thus, if FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1, the presence of CETA may help
reduce per capita emissions of GHGs in a typical EU member. This study provides robust
and consistently statistically significant evidence in support of the latter claim. Canada
is capital-abundant, rich and sparsely populated as compared to an average EU member.
Therefore, if FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1, per capita emissions of GHGs may increase
in Canada due to the implementation of CETA. The empirical results reported in the study,
validate the latter argument when M2 and M3 is employed, but they are not statistically
significant under any empirical method used in the paper. Hence, in Canada FEH and
PHH2 eliminate PHH1 in the presence of CETA.
Furthermore, it is shown that a higher trade intensity between Canada and EU members
that are capital-abundant and rich reduces per capita emissions of GHGs in each of the
latter EU members. This result stand because PHH1 and PHH2 dominate FEH. In addition,
per capita emissions of GHGs could fall in all labor-abundant but rich EU members as a
consequence of the implementation of CETA. This implies that FEH, PHH1, and PHH2 may
force the latter EU members to mainly produce relatively cleaner goods and import the
relatively dirtier goods from Canada. Further, the presence of CETA would also reduce per
capita emissions of GHGs in the majority of labor-abundant but poor EU members. This
suggests that in latter EU members, FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1. There is no evidence
that confirms the argument that more trade between Canada and capital-abundant but
poor EU members should increase per capita emissions of GHGs in the latter EU members.
In addition, the results of the study imply that per capita emissions of GHGs may be
reduce more in CETA members that are landlocked, or are not using Euro as their official
currency, or use English or French, as one of their official languages.
In a nutshell, the empirical results reported in this paper suggest that the presence of
CETA may truly help in the global fight against the negative and international externality
of air pollution. It is shown that the implementation of CETA, may reduce (albeit in a very
marginal way) per capita emissions of GHGs in a typical CETA member. This result is based
on the empirical validity of simple economics theories on the impacts of trade openness
on air pollution, where FEH and PHH2 dominate PHH1. Surprisingly, the robust and sta-
tistically significant results suggest that the presence of CETA may help reduce per capita
emissions of GHGs in almost all EU members. Moreover, there is no statistically significant
evidence which implies that the presence of CETA could shift some GHGs emissions from
most of the EU members towards Canada, or vice versa.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Unit Root Tests
Variable Dimension N Mean SD Min Max Unit Root Tests
GHGs tons/capita 783 16.79 31.08 4.19 219.74 -3.658*** †
Trade (X+M)/GDP 783 0.056% 0.095% 0.003% 0.74% -6.857*** ∗
Rel. K/L CAN = 1 783 0.856 0.365 0.041 1.655 -5.774*** ‡
Rel. I CAN = 1 696 0.725 0.502 0.029 2.519 -2.745*** †
Rel. LPC CAN = 1 783 0.077 0.179 0.002 1 N.A.
I 2011 USD 696 27,894.18 19,931.42 949.97 117,633.5 -2.313** ‡
K/L 2011 USD 783 248,425.3 133,666 88,99.91 690,601.9 -1.400* ‡
FDI/GDP % 783 12.53 47.86 -75.31 731.93 -6.909*** †
LPC Sq.Km/capita 783 0.024 0.056 0.001 0.359 -2.478*** †
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. For all series, we use
the Z-t-tilde-bar statistic of the Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test where the AR parameter is panel specific. The
null states that all panels contain unit roots, while the alternative states that some panels are stationary. ∗, †, ‡
means that the unit root test controls for (i) a trend only, (ii) trend and a squared trend term and (iii) trend, a
squared trend, and a cubic trend term, respectively. Relative Land per Capita is stationary around a constant.
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Table 2: Relative (to Canada) Measures of Income, Capital/Labor and Land per Capita
ratios
Country Relative Income Relative K/L ratio Relative LPC ratio
Austria 1.117367 1.127084 0.032709
Belgium 1.045962 1.285901 0.009241
Bulgaria 0.101232 0.146827 0.045332
Canada 1 1 1
Croatia 0.247387 0.585975 0.04072
Cyprus 0.640459 1.136682 0.030083
Czechia 0.337635 1.002536 0.024289
Denmark 1.362923 1.046758 0.0254
Estonia 0.240707 0.483427 0.104469
Finland 1.086206 1.090806 0.205616
France 1.03528 1.032433 0.032846
Germany 1.081756 1.021696 0.013947
Greece 0.560493 1.186642 0.038921
Hungary 0.250218 0.570419 0.029318
Ireland 1.106298 0.987077 0.055093
Italy 0.884257 1.326103 0.016532
Latvia 0.188636 0.628461 0.091297
Lithuania 0.199943 0.388242 0.062963
Luxembourg 2.193493 1.377379 0.017903
Malta 0.441521 0.562086 0.002523
Netherlands 1.159178 0.967618 0.008222
Poland 0.211064 0.321403 0.026071
Portugal 0.496686 0.944284 0.02846
Romania 0.123457 0.285539 0.035586
Slovakia 0.255806 0.586686 0.029074
Slovenia 0.493314 0.846416 0.032077
Spain 0.682424 1.013103 0.037631
Sweden 1.259957 1.053778 0.157782
UK 1.062318 0.843649 0.01283
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GHGs: M(1) GHGs: M(2) GHGs: M(3)
1
2
3
Note: Each vertical axis corresponds to the Trade Elasticities of GHGs produced by the Fixed Effects (FE) specification of Models
M1, M2, and M3, respectively. The first row plots the elasticities with respect to Relative Income, the second with respect to
the Relative Capital/Labor (K/L) ratio, and the third with respect to Relative Land Per Capita (LPC), respectively. The vertical
line in each case corresponds to the elasticity coefficient of Canada, which provides the benchmark for the Relative Income, K/L,
and LPC variables, respectively. The Fitting Curve provides an ad-hoc polynomial approximation to help the reader visualize the
pattern in the elasticities.
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